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Editor's Note: After the presentationof the articles, the symposium concluded with
a structured debate and an open discussion. The participantsin the debate were
ProfessorBlakey and Mr. Crovitz. The ensuing discussion was moderatedby Professor Coffee andfeatured ProfessorBlakey, Mr. Coffey, and Mr. Crovitz, as well
as questionsfrom the audience. The edited transcript is presented below.'
I.
A.

Debate

Opening Statement of Mr. Crovitz

Coming to the Notre Dame Law School to debate Robert Blakey on
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law makes me feel
like Daniel approaching the lion's den. I'm tempted to offer my own
prayer, "Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I
will fear no RICO."
The best analysis of what the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law has done in the uncontrolled hands of federal prosecutors and plaintiffs' lawyers was written years before the legislative scandal
of 1970, RICO. This analysis came not in any law-review article or court
opinion, but in a book-length poem written in 1966 by a libertarian
named R.W. Grant. Mr. Grant's book entitled The IncredibleBreadMachine
is a political and economic allegory. The hero of our story is Tom Smith,
and he has made an invention that produces, wraps and slices loaves of
bread for less than a penny. A wonderful discovery, but with unfortunate
consequences for Mr. Smith. The government raises taxes on business,
and the price goes up to a full cent per loaf. Of course he is still under* WiiamJ. and Dorothy O'Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
•* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
•** Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Crimial Division, United States
Department ofJustice.
**** Assistant Editorial Page Editor, Wall StreetJournal.
I The participants were given the opportunity to review the transcript and provide citations
where appropriate. The Law Review extends special thanks to Bonnie Grimslid for her selfless assistance in transcribing the proceedings.
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selling any of his competitors, but there is much consternation because
people had grown used to paying less than one cent per loaf. Here's what
happened, as the poem says:
To comprehend confusion,
We seek wisdom at its source!
To whom, then did the people turn?
The INTELLECTUALS of course!
And what could be a better time
For them to take the lead,
Than at their INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON INHUMANITY AND GREED!...
"The time has come," the chairman said,
"To speak of many things:
Of duty, bread and selfishness,
And the evil that it brings.
For speaking thus we can amend
That irony of fate
That gives to unenlightened minds
The power to create!"...
And so it went, one by one,
Denouncing private greed
Denouncing those who profit
thus
2
From other people's need!
Then the press picked up the clamor against Tom Smith:
One night a TV star cried out,
"Forgive me if I stumble,
But I don't think, I kid you not,
That Smith is very humble!"
Growing bolder, he leaped up,
(silencing the cheers)
"Humility!" he cried to all- 3
And then collapsed in tears!
Then it was the politicians' turn:
The clamor rises all about;
Now hear the politicians shout:
"What's Smith done, so rich to be?
Why should Smith have more than thee?
So, down with Smith and down4 with greed;
I'll protect your right to need!"
Then it was the turn of other businessmen, those who couldn't compete
with Tom Smith:
Then Tom found to his dismay
That certain businessmen would say,
"The people now should realize
It's time to cut Smith down to size,
For he's betrayed his public trust
2 R.W. GRANT, THE INCREDIBLE BREAD MACHINE (1960).
3 Id.

4 Id.
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(and taken all the bread from us") 5
Finally, it was the turn of the government, in the form of antitrust
prosecutors:
"Smith has too much crust," they said.
"A deplorable condition
That Robber Barons profit thus
From cutthroat competition!"
Well!
Now this was getting serious!
So Smith felt he must
Have a friendly interview
With the men in Antitrust.
So, hat in hand, he went to them.
They'd surely been misled!
No rule of law had he defied!
But then their lawyer said:
"The rule of law, in complex times,
Has proved itself deficient.
We much prefer the rule of men!
It's vastly more efficien!" 6
Tom Smith is indicted, tried and sentenced to five years.
As I indicated, yesterday, in the 1980s, we had a real-life Tom Smith
in Michael Milken. An investment banker who, instead of sticking to the
usual activities of underwriting and brokerage, made a discovery every
bit as important to the economy as bread loaves that would sell for less
than a penny. Hundreds of small firms found access to capital they never
had before, and many jobs were created. Then some intellectuals, some
in the press, many in Congress, many Wall Street competitors who resented Drexel Burnham Lambert and finally the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the U.S. Attorney's Office in Manhattan decided that
Michael Milken had to be brought down. There was nothing illegal in
junk bonds or hostile takeovers, but RICO was the way out of this
inefficiency.
Similarly, it is not a crime to engage in civil disobedience against an
abortion clinic. Yet it is a RICO offense, according to a Third Circuit
case. Robert Blakey helped draft the appeal to the Supreme Court, which
failed. This proved that even Dr. Frankenstein cannot control his RICO
monster. Nor is there any reason to think that Congress meant to make
all state common law actions involving a telephone or the mails a potential federal offense, or meant to make half of all federal criminal prosecutions potential RICO cases, as Paul Coffey told us yesterday is now the
current situation.
Rather than get bogged down in which RICO reform package in
Congress I prefer, if any, and what the prospects for passage might be, I
want to try to broaden the debate. My thesis this morning is that the
future of RICO is inversely related to the future health of the notion of
the Rule of Law.
5 Id
6 Id.
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We now have the remarkable spectacle of people throughout Eastern Europe throwing off their former systems and declaring that they
want a system a lot more like ours. They want democracy, and elections,
and freer markets, and, they say, the Rule of Law and not the rule of
men. So it's an appropriate time to think about how well we have protected our priceless heritage of law.
Here is the description of a Rule of Law that I have in mind. This is a
concept chiefly aimed at protecting the liberty and autonomy of the individual against government actions that are either obviously or rather subtly illegitimate. Some rule-of-law protections are very familiar: due
process, equal protection, speedy justice. Some rule of law protections
are less well understood and, in this country, less well enforced than perhaps they once were. The one I have in mind is that no person can legitimately be punished or fined or forced to pay damages for any conduct
not clearly forbidden by law.
This means that our civil and criminal laws should be reasonably
clear to people; that people know with some certainty what behavior is
permissible and what behavior is impermissible; that we have bright-line
standards for behavior and not judicial or legislative arbitrariness; that
there is some predictability and certainty in our law; and that there is a
minimum of vagueness or changeable standards. Anything less is arbitrary law, counter to the rule of law.
My thesis is that we in the United States are in danger of losing our
inheritance of the Rule of Law-and that Public Enemy Number One of
the Rule of Law is RICO. It was passed as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act, yet on the civil side more than 90% of the RICO cases are
now against legitimate businesses, and increasingly, prosecutors are using criminal RICO against legitimate outfits such as investment banks,
trading firms, and labor unions. Pre-trial punishments raise due process
and other fairness issues. As I said yesterday, as a result of RICO's extraordinary threat against Drexel Burnham Lambert, no one knows
whether the plea was for actual lawbreaking or simply to avoid the much
worse effects on its business from an indictment, even if no one was ever
found guilty of anything. No one on Wall Street was able to learn from
the Drexel plea what behavior, if any, of Drexel's was illegal. The case,
for all its hoopla, did nothing to alert people to what behavior is permissible and what is impermissible.
The predicate acts of RICO, especially the vague wire and mail fraud
statutes, make RICO, with its twenty-year sentence, as vague as a charge
of undefined "fraud." Who could know that one may be sued and convicted as a "racketeer" for making two phone calls, or mailing two letters,
or making one phone call and mailing one letter, or sending one fax and
making one modem transmission? The RICO Guidelines of the Justice
Department are honored more in their breach, giving us a government of
men, not of laws, with the very real danger of selective prosecution. The
Supreme Court has suggested that there may be due process considerations here, but the Justices continue to routinely uphold RICO cases.
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I think the Supreme Court is largely to blame for the breakdown in
the Rule of Law. It is the court of last resort for many disputes, butjust as
importantly it sets the tone and style of judging for the lower federal
courts and for the state courts as well. By its very selection of cases in
recent years, it is clear that the Supreme Court does not have on its
agenda any emphasis on insuring clear, predictable, certain rules. It has
not clarified "pattern," "enterprise," or "racketeering." Justice Antonin
Scalia, writing for three other justices, noted that RICO is so vague it is
'7
like saying, "life is a fountain."
Consider how the Supreme Court has considered one minor controversy: What kind of religious symbols can be exhibited by local governments on public land during the December holidays? The clarity of the
rules on this issue given by the Justices stands in inverse proportion to
the high number of these cases they hear. The current jurisprudence on
this issue, I think, is that a city can have a Christmas tree and Menorah so
long as it also has a few plastic Frosty-the-Snowmen. Or maybe a city
could have a creche so long as two of the Three Wise Men were Santa
Claus and Rudolph the Red-Nosed-Reindeer.
Last year just before his untimely death, University of Chicago law
professor Paul Bator gave a very important speech at the University of
Pittsburgh entitled, "What is Wrong With the Supreme Court?" Professor Bator framed the issue this way, which I think applies perfectly to
RICO:
Does the American legal system now possess an acceptable and adequate institutional system for the essential professional tasks of stabilizing, clarifying, and improving the national law, so as to make it
usable and useful for its consumers? 8
Professor Bator continued:
By "consumers" I mean citizens and firms who have to obey rules or
plan in the context of these rules; lawyers who have to give advice with
respect to them; and administrative and trial judges who must apply
them in the first instance.9
Professor Bator concluded that the Supreme Court has not done a very
good job of providing reasonably intelligible and reasonably sensible
guidelines for consumers of law. He mentioned among other problems
the extraordinarily vague standards of behavior now routinely issued by
Congress. Certainly RICO practitioners know what Professor Bator
meant. The same is true with inside-trading laws, where Congress actually has a policy of not issuing clear rules, with the telling explanation
that people would just get around them if there were clear rules.
Professor Bator made another point as well. He said that allowing
"uncertainty and disuniformity and contradiction and malfunction to
persist exacts costs, paid for, precisely, by the consumers of law." 1 0 He
said that it was "intolerable arrogant and elitist to be unconcerned about
7 HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2907 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
8 Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 674 (1990).
9 Id.
10 Id.
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these costs," 1 ' singling out fellow legal academics and others whose concern is more with changing the law than with providing clear rules.
There is also an important characteristic of our legal system that
makes it very different from the systems of our common-law cousins elsewhere, and that helps explain why a breakdown in the Rule of Law has
occurred here and not in those countries. We have a legal system with
economic incentives in favor of litigating. We have abolished almost all
rules of champerty, barratry and maintenance, to allow contingency fee
litigation. We have relaxed rules to allow class action suits. Discovery
can be an enticement to fish for damages. RICO has its treble damages
and lawyers' fees, with huge settlement value for the libelous term "racketeering." The problem is this: The more uncertainty and contradiction
in the law, the greater the need incentive to litigate, the more new cases
there will be. This is a downward-sloping circle that does great damage
to the Rule of Law.
Some RICO apologists acknowledge all this, but say that RICO is
still needed to protect people from the evils of the marketplace. Many of
you may be familiar with the work from earlier this century by the English
scholar and novelist G.K. Chesterton. I have in mind particularly his very
entertaining novel, The Man Who Was Thursday, which is about a group of
anarchists set on taking over England. There is a discussion of anarchy
by one of the characters in this novel that makes the case for the opposite, for the Rule of Law as an important consideration, especially for the
least advantaged people among us:
So you talk about mobs and the working classes as if they were the
question. You've got that eternal idiotic idea that if anarchy came it
would come from the poor. Why should it? The poor have been
rebels, but they have never been anarchists; they have more interest
than anyone else in there being some decent government. The poor
man really has a stake in the country.
The rich man hasn't; he can go
away to New Guinea in a yacht.' 2
We all know that rich Americans don't go away to New Guinea in yachts.
Instead, they hire the best lawyers they can find to protect them from our
version of anarchy, uncertain laws. This might be good for some lawyers,
especially RICO lawyers. But the life of the law-and of lawyers-would
be more beneficial and more gratifying if it did more good. Doing good
today, I think, means recasting our legal system and our laws to give people the clear, commonsensical laws that they deserve. This surely includes abolishing RICO and starting over.
I want to leave you with the best evidence I have seen of RICO's
threat to the notion of a Rule of Law. For anyone who still thinks that
RICO is viewed primarily as a tool against legitimate business, let the
experts speak for themselves. Boston mob leader Gennaro Angiulo and
four of his associates were tried and ultimately convicted under RICO.
But the following is an excerpt from an FBI wiretap in April, 1981,
played at the trial on August 23, 1985. On the tape are Mr. Angiulo and
11 Id.
12 G.K. CHESTERTON, THE MAN WHO WAS THURSDAY 189-90 (1908).
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his deputy, Ilario M.A. Zannino discussing RICO. The two obviously seriously believed that the statute only applies to legitimate business and
not to them; they could only be accused of engaging in acts such as murder and arson and not RICO because they never got involved in infiltrating legitimate business:
Angiulo: "Our argument is we're illegitimate business."
Zannino: "We're a shylock [loan shark]."
Angiulo: "We're a shylock."
Zannino: "Yeah."
Angiulo: "We're a [expletive] bookmaker."
Zannino: "Bookmaker."
Angiulo: "We're selling marijuana."
Zannino: "We're not infiltrating."
Angiulo: "We're illegal here, illegal there. We're arsonists. "We're
every [expletive] thing."
Zannino: "Pimps."
Angiulo: "So what?"
Zannino: "Prostitutes."
Angiulo: "The law does not cover us, is that right?"
Zannino: "We're not infiltrating legitimate business for all the [expletive] money in the world." 13
Or, as R.W. Grant wrote: "The rule of law, in complex times,/Has
proved itself deficient./We much prefer the rule of menl/It's vastly more
14
efficient!"
B.

Opening Statement of Professor Blakey

There is no argument between us. He has basically conceded my
point. He suggests that we should have a Rule of Law. I agree, and I
suggest that I, too, take my stand with those barons at Runnymeade in
1215 who insisted that those who held and exercised power should be
subject to the Rule of Law.
And that was precisely what Congress attempted in 1970. It enacted
the Organized Crime Control Act, Title 9 of which is known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or "RICO" for short.
RICO applies to patterns of violence, the provision of illegal goods and
services, corruption in government and in unions, and commercial
fraud-by, through, or against enterprises. It provides criminal and civil
remedies for the government, and yes, it gives to individuals the rightin the American way-to help themselves through treble damages and
counsel fees-to sue those people who do not simply engage in crime,
but engage in patterns of crime.
The RICO statute was not initially used by either the federal government or private people. Today, however, it is widely used. The federal
government has found it to be the prosecutive tool of choice in organized crime, white collar crime, and other areas. Approximately thirtyseven percent of the indictments is in the area of organized crime-not
13 ButterfieldJuty Hears Tape on Gang Wars in Boston Trial, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at A26, col.

I.
14 R.W. GRANT,supra note 2, at 34.
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just the Mafia, but other sophisticated criminal groups. Fourty-four percent is in the area of white collar crime--corrupt governmental officials,
union officials, and others who abuse their power in our society. Another
nineteen percent is in the area of terrorism: the prosecution, for example, of the anti-semitic white hate group in the West responsible for the
murder of Alan Berg took place under the RICO statute.
Today, after precisely the same kind of arguments and debates you
will hear today, twenty-nine states have adopted little RICO statutes,
twenty-one of which also have the private civil remedies provision.
This statute's character can be judged by the character of its enemies-who objects to it. As my good friend, Gordon, puts it so well, mob
figures object to it. They actually took the position that this statute only
applied to legitimate business. The Angiulos lost that case in the
Supreme Court in a case called United States v. Turkette15 by a vote of eight
to one.
On the other side, legitimate business people took precisely the opposite position and argued that RICO applied only to organized crime.
And they are persistent. They took that issue to the Supreme Court, not
once, but twice. In Sedima,1 6 a unanimous Supreme Court on this question said that the statute did not only apply to organized crime but also to
legitimate business. RICO says "any person"-not any person whose
name happened to end with a vowel-not any person whose collar happened to be blue-RICO applies to anyone with a white collar-or a blue
collar-or no collar at all-or-and let me go further and take this example of anti-abortionists who demonstrate-people whose collars are
turned around. It makes no difference if you walk in a doctor's office
whether your name is O'Neill or Corleone: if you engage in a pattern of
extortion against the good doctor, RICO applies to you. No inculpation
for Italians and no exculpation for Catholics.
Let me read to you what the Supreme Court said in response to the
argument that somehow that this statute did not apply outside the organized crime area. This argument, the Court says-unanimously says-in
H.J. Inc.:
[F]inds no support in the Act's text, and is at odds with the tenor of
the legislative history. ...
...

The Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more gen-

eral statute, one which although it had organized crime as its focus,
was not limited in application to organized crime. ...
...Congress realized that the stereotypical view of organized
crime as consisting of a circumscribed set of illegal activities, such as
gambling and prostitution, was no longer satisfactory
1 7 because criminal
activity had expanded into legitimate enterprises.
RICO acknowledges, the Court said:
15 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
16 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1984).
17 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2903, 2905 (1989).
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[T]he breakdown of the traditional conception of organized crime and
responds to a new situation in which persons engaged in long-term
criminal activity often operate wholly within legitimate enterprises.
Congress drafted RICO broadly enough to encompass a wide range of
criminal activity, taking many different forms, and likely8 to attract a
broad array of perpetrators operating in different ways.'
The argument that somehow the statute is only for those people whose
names' end in vowels is obscene and ought to be rejected.
The objection, though, is as to its application to white collar crime.
Let's look for a moment at white collar crime. The Chamber of Commerce, in 1974, suggested that white collar crime-principally fraudinflicted on this country approximately $41 billion in damages. The Attorney General in 1985 raised that estimate to $200 billion.
I am not saying million, I am saying billion. What's the difference
between a billion and a million dollars? Its more than a "g" or "m." Four
inches of $1,000 dollar bills is a million dollars. A billion dollars is three
quarters of the way up the Washington Monument.
We are talking about $200 billion a year. That's about what the illegal traffic in drugs-retail-is.
And that is an understatement, because in 1985 we did not know
about the white collar crime wave occurring not only on Wall Street, and
LaSalle Street, but on every Main Street in this country. It's called the
savings and loan crisis.
Let's discuss the savings and loan crisis. It is going to cost us $500
billion over the next 30 years to shut down as-many as 600 savings and
loans. Three-fourths of those savings and loans, all the studies agree,
went down not because of the collapse in the real estate market, not because of the collapse in international oil, but because of fraud by insiders.
Let's talk about one of the cases, not because it is the only case, but
because it is illustrative. Lincoln Savings and Loan went down and it cost
us $2.5 billion. Shortly before it went down, the accounting firm of Arthur Young & Co. gave it unqualified audit approval. Nothing was wrong
with its books. And based on that unqualified approval, 23,000 people
invested their life savings in over $200 million worth ofjunk bonds. Today, the Resolution Trust Corporation and those 23,000 people in a class
action are suing Mr. Keating under RICO. And those people who suggest that RICO ought to be rolled back or rewritten are saying that us,
those of us who have got to come up with the $2.5 billion-or the 23,000
people-ought not have an effective criminal and/or civil remedy to vindicate ourselves.
This is not the only illustration I can raise. EMS Securities, a brokerdealer selling government bonds in Florida, was corrupt, and it corrupted an accountant who was with Grant Thorton. It continued in business long after it should have been shut down. And when it fell, it took
down 69 thrifts in the State of Ohio. It cost those people $315 million.
I could continue. I could talk about the scandals in Chicago, the
traders who were recorded by the FBI discussing their attitude towards
18 id at 2905.
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the people they dealt with, "[expletive deleted] the customers. I'm going
to take it for me."
I could talk about the brokers who were recorded on their own tapes
in Princeton/Newport, who talked about, "Welcome to the world of
sleaze."
We are facing in this country today a crisis, not only in lack of physical integrity-because our streets are not safe-but also in lack of fiscal
integrity.
Our financial markets are losing that essential glue that is required
to make a capitalist system work. And that is trust.
Let's talk about trust. The Wall StreetJournal-atleast in its news sections a reliable newspaper-reports a study indicating that only one industry is worse-in the sense of confidence of the American peoplethan insurance, banking, and brokers. Well, that industry is the airlines.
Of those American industries that we have the least confidence in, only
airlines is worse than insurance, banking and brokers. 19
And it is not just our financial institutions, it is our political institutions. The Wall StreetJournal also reports a poll, in 1964, that 64% of the
American people asked said that they believed that this country was run
for the benefit of all. At that time, only 29% thought that it was run by a
few for the benefit of the few. In 1988, those figures were exactly reversed. The poll indicated that 31% of the American people believed
that this country was run for the benefit of all, but 64% thought it was
20
run by the few for the benefit of the few.
That lack of trust can only be restored by an effective enforcement of
the law that holds everyone accountable for what he does.
I am insisting here not on a Rule of Law that cannot be understood,
but on a Rule of Law that applies with an even hand to everyone.
Gordon suggested RICO is hard to understand. Let's get down to
the particulars. RICO does not apply unless you violate the predicate
offenses. And the predicate offenses he is deeply disturbed about are the
fraud offenses. Nobody falls into fraud accidently. It is unequivocally the
case that good faith is an excuse.
And they question a lack of clarity: let me give you two concrete
examples from Supreme Court cases.
What constitutes an unreasonable deduction under the Internal Revenue Code? Lawyers don't know. The answer is ask your accountant,
maybe he knows. But nobody goes down for willful evasion of taxes unless he does it with intent to defraud under United States v. Ragen.2 1 And
it was because of the presence of, and the requirement of, "intent to defraud" that must be shown by proving a double set of books and other
indicia of bad faith that led the Supreme Court to sustain the tax evasion
statute because it required an appropriate state of mind.
Let me turn to another concrete example: selling kosher meat. Is
that a definite standard? Ask five rabbis what kosher is and you will get at
19 Wall St.J., Sept. 20, 1989, at B1, col. 3.
20 Wall St.J., Aug. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
21 314 U.S. 513 (1942).
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least seven answers. But the Supreme Court sustained in Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman2 2 a statute prohibiting selling kosher meat that wasn't
kosher because the legislature said you had to sell the kosher meat with
the intent to defraud. And it was precisely that intent that gave concrete
meaning and prevented the innocent from accidently falling into it.
Gordon suggested that the antitrust statutes were somehow not a
terribly good idea. A similar business coalition fought the antitrust statutes, and it took it up to the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Holmes, in the
Nash decision, 23 upheld a statute that prohibited "unreasonable restraint
of trade," and he sustained it on an analogy to the law of homicide. It
said that when we give to a person a defense of self-defense, that is, the
right to use reasonable force, and that line defines the difference between
"in and out" for murder, then we need not give a more concrete standard to people who cheat in business when they deny us access to
markets.
To give "more" to the businessman and "less" to those who engage
in street crime is not what the American system is all about.
When Gordon says he wants rules-mathemtical rules-he wants
them because he wants to have a system where he can play the rules in
order to beat the system, and not live up to the system.
Mr. Justice Brandeis suggested in American Column & Lumber. Co. v.
United States2 4 that there were three ways that you could exercise illicit
power in the market: agreement, force or fraud. The antitrust acts, enacted in 1890, deal with freedom in the marketplace: no illegal agreements. RICO was enacted in 1970 to deal with the other two elements:
force and fraud. It protects not only physical integrity, it also protects
fiscal integrity. Those people who would suggest that we ought not have
RICO or the antitrust statutes are standing against not only integrity, but
freedom. I am for autonomy too, but I want it balanced by intergrity and
freedom.
I am for the antitrust laws fairly interpreted and fairly enforced.
I am also for RICO, fairly interpreted and fairly enforced.
What are we doing in the law in the 20th century? The 20th century
is being spent modifying the 19th century. We had laissez-faire capitalism and caveat emptor in the 19th century. We put the thumb of the law
on the scale for the entrepreneur capitalists. We set up rules of limited
liability for corporations. We set up rules that externalize the cost of development. You know them from torts. The three wicked sisters: assumption of risk, the fellow servant rule, and contributory negligence. What
was the impact of these rules? It meant the that the Vanderbilts of this
country grew rich and the Wongs in the West and the Kellys in the East
lost their arms and legs uncompensated: they paid for the railroads with
their bodies. The law externalized the cost from the entrepreneur capitalist to his employees, or his customers.
22 266 U.S. 497 (1925).
23 United States v. Nash, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
24 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921).
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The same thing happened in the 19th century law of fraud. We
wrote it from the perspective of the person attracting capital, not investing capital.
We have modified those doctrines, we now have workmen's compensation and other similar laws.
We tried to face up to the fact of the large trust when we enacted the
Sherman Act in 1890. And yes we tried to face up to corruption and
fraud on the securities markets in '33 and '34. Senator Duncan Fletcher
at the time said that the federal securities statutes were designed to "protect the public from financial racketeering" on Wall Street.2 5 And that's
a quote. And what did we hear from Wall Street at the times? These
statutes were so draconian, they would dry up capital. They would drive
investment bankers out of business; they would end the ability to raise
capital. They were wrong then, and they're wrong now.
Gordon mentioned Michael Milken, and I don't want to try Mr.
Milken. I don't even want to try Drexel who, incidently, plead guilty. I
don't think it is necessary to do that. But if you want to read a little book,
by Connie Bruck called the Predator'sBall. It is a detailed study of the rise
and fall of Mr. Milken and Drexel, and this is its conclusion:
[I]f ever there was a case outside of the organized crime area that
seemed appropriate for RICO prosecution, it is the case against
Milken and Drexel. If the SEC's allegations are true, Drexel under
Milken was a major, ongoing criminal enterprise where continuing violations of security and mail fraud statutes were perpetrated over
a pe26
riod of years, accumulating hundreds of millions of dollars.
Indeed, if one puts aside violence-I don't suggest to you organized
crime and white collar crime are the same-violence does draw a distinction between them-, but, on the other hand, let's not suggest that white
collar crime is not violent.
Talk to people who are dying of cancer because of asbestos, when
the industry never told us what they knew-that it was dangerous.
Talk to the people in Denver who are now going to die of radioactive
fallout. Rocky Flats was administrated in a dangerous fashion and they
never told us that it was that way.
Talk to other people just like them in Ohio who are going to die of
cancer.
I think, maybe, I would prefer to be shot by organized crime than go
out by degrees with cancer. I am not equating organized crime and white
collar crime, but they are not wholly different.
Apart from the question of violence, there are parallels between
traditional organized crime and the organization that the patriarch of
Drexel built. Quoting from Bruck, she says Drexel was the "brass-knuckles threatening, market-manipulating, Cosa Nostra of the securities
world." 27 That was her description of the company that Milken put
together.
25 77 CONG. REC. 3801 (1933).
26 C. BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BAL. 370 (1989).
27 Id.

1990]

THE FUTURE OF RICO

1085

There was a suggestion that somehow Milken might have to plead
guilty or Drexel plead guilty because of RICO. This is her comment on
that:
[I]f Drexel and its lawyers had believed that the government had no
case, they surely would have elected to fight even against the formidable might of RICO. (With over $2 billion in capital the firm could easily haveposted
the bond to satisfy the government's pretrial forfeiture
claims.) 2s
What really happened by the end of 1988 was not that Giuliani's threat of
a RICO indictment deprived Drexel of a fair trial, but that the government's case had grown immeasurably stronger.
Drexel plead guilty because it was guilty. Let's talk about what it was
guilty of. The indictment Drexel fought was worth $1.85 billion of forfeiture. What did Drexel settle the case for? $650 million. Instead of being
shocked at the amount of money Drexel had to pay out, why don't you
ask for the grounds on which Drexel was given a discount. From $1.85
billion to $650 million. Gordon suggests that Drexel got a raw deal. I
think we got a raw deal. This case was plea-bargained away. I wish they
had tried it; they should have taken the $1.85 billion from Drexel.
That's what the appropriate penalty was.
Let's look at RICO's forfeitures. What does RICO say about
forfeitures?
Two simple propositions. If you steal it, you give it back. That's
hardly draconian, that's poetic.
If you misuse it, you lose it.
That's poetic too. If a dope dealer can lose a car, a boat, an airplane,
or a condo because he uses it in dealing in dope, why can't a securities
broker lose his car, his boat, his airplane and, yes, his broker dealership,
if that happens to be the instrumentality though which he perpetrates the
fraud?
I'm for the Rule of Law.
I'm for an evenhanded application of the law.
Let me end with another illustration. In 1978, an organized crime
led byJohn Gotti set up a heist on the Lufthansa airlines. They made $8
million, the largest cash haul in the history of organized crime. Yesterday, in testimony in the federal court in Washington, dealing with Keating's corrupt S & L, Leventhal & Co. testified that in fifteen transactions,
Keating sucked out-of it $155 million by giving away money to generate
false profits.
I ask you. Who does more harm to us-Gotti stealing eight, or Keating stealing 155?
C. Rebuttal of Mr. Crovitz
Professor Blakey, it seems to me, equates mobsters roaming the
streets to inside traders corrupting Wall Street. I do not. I want to talk
just a second about that. You say that a drug dealer ought to have his
28 Id
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proceeds from his illegal transactions taken. I think that a white-collar
criminal who engages in white collar crime ought to have his profits
taken. I want equal justice for violent criminals and white collar
criminals. Let's take the case of Princeton/Newport. The original allegation against Princeton/Newport was the government thought they had
underpaid taxes by $13 million. The government wanted a bond of $23
million. The government ended up by getting a forfeiture of the entire
company worth $300 million. When it was all over the IRS sent a letter to
Princeton/Newport saying: "Gee fellows, I am awful sorry, you overpaid
your taxes." I don't think there is justice in that case. I think that one
reason was that Rudolph Giuliani, during his time in the U.S. Attorney's
office in the last few years, due to remarkable lack of supervision by the
Justice Department, did allow people to accidently fall into fraud, contrary to what Professor Blakey said.
Charles Keating, according to allegations, did what a lot of other S &
L owners did, and he did something else. What he did, along with a lot of
other S & L operators and with their accountants, was he took the government's invitation to have guaranteed deposits and gambled with investors' money. The government said: you get the money, if you lose it,
we will pay you back; if you make money, you get to keep it. Now I know
what I would do in that situation. I think I know what you would do, and
that is what a lot of the thrift operators did.
But Arthur Young said the books look fine under the government
rules. The same Congress that wrote RICO wrote the rules governing
the S & L's. They are both terrible, and quite honestly, stupid laws. One
of the true offenses in the Keating case appears to be misrepresentation,
which is a classic common law offense. One of the allegations is misrepresentation in which he supposedly told retired people, nuns, and others
that some debentures that were not in fact guaranteed were covered by a
government guarantee. Classic misrepresentation that's been in the
courts for 500 years: we don't need RICO for that.
Now I think what is going on here is something quite different. I
think what we have here is a deeper, social and political problem. I want
to invoke here a social commentator named Tom Wolfe, who captured
the spirit that defends RICO the way Robert Blakey defends RICO in his
description of the attitude of prosecutors towards their targets in his
book The Bonfire of the Vanities. These prosecutors had all hoped to find
some target other than the street punk, the violent criminal, the drug
dealer, and the mobster who make up the vast bulk of their seemingly
endless, and perhaps, they even come to think futile caseloads. Tom
Wolfe refers to the "Great White Defendant." He does not mean this as a
racial matter; what he means is that prosecutors naturally feel somewhat
uneasy these days that so many criminal defendants in big cities happen
to be black or Hispanic; it's also true that victims happen to be black or
Hispanic. The phrase also refers to those defendants- the Princeton/
Newports, the Drexels, the Michael Milkens-that our criminal justice
system can still pursue and punish. This passage describes the thoughts
of a young prosecutor on his way to work in the Bronx. I think you
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should keep this passage in mind when ever you think about RICO. It has
,
tremendous power.
Every assistant DA in the Bronx from the youngest Italian just out of
St. John's Law School to the oldest Irish bureau chief.., shared Captain Ahab's mania for the Great White Defendant .... And he understood what it was that gave him a momentary lift each morning as he
saw the island fortress rise at the crest of the Grand Concourse from
the gloom of the Bronx. For it was nothing less than the Power ... the
power of the government over the freedom of its subjects. To think of
it in the abstract made it seem so theoretical and academic, but to feel it
...
now to see that little swallow offright in a perfect neck worth millions, well the poet has never sung of that ecstasy, or even dreamed of
it, and no prosecutor, no judge, no cop, no income tax auditor will
ever enlighten him, for we dare not even mention it to one another, do
we? And yet we feel it and we know it, every time they look at us with
those eyes and beg for mercy or, if not mercy, Lord, dumb luck or
capricious generosity. (Just one break!). What are all the limestone
facades of Fifth Avenue and all the marble halls and stuffed-leather
libraries and all of the riches of Wall Street in the face of my control
29
over your destiny and your helplessness in the face of the Power?
D. Rebuttal of Professor Blakey
Mr. Crovitz reads fiction to you. I would like to talk facts and logic
with you. The logic is this: it is an example of the use of an illicit major to
state a single example and to go from that single example to argue for
the repeal of the entire statute. What you would have to do with
Princeton/Newport is establish that this case is representative of the administration of the statue as a whole that it is illustrative, and not exceptional. I do not concede to you that Princeton/Newport is an example of
a bad prosecution. But even if it were, one swallow does not make a summer in Capistrano, and one bad RICO doesn't justify the repeal of the
statute.
Let's take a look at the other half of the Princeton/Newport story.
Gordon is good, but only with half truths. Do you know what a half truth
is? It is a half lie. The other half of what was in the Newport case was the
manipulation of stock. They drove down the price of stock. They deprived people of the ability to sell it at a fair market price. That's not tax
evasion; that is stealing from the people who weren't able to sell it in a
fair market. The Princeton/Newport people were appropriately indicted,
tried, and convicted.
He suggests to you let the 23,000 people in the Keating matter sue
under traditional law. Give them actual damages. What are actual damages? Are they actually actual damages? No, they don't include the transaction costs-counsels' fees and other things. They don't include the
opportunity cost-what the people could have done with that $200 million. They could have put it somewhere else. Calling "actual" damages
"actual" damages is a fiction out of the 19th century; they are not just.
Triple damages move in the right direction.
29 T. WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIEs 615-16 (paperback ed. 1988) (emphasis in original).
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Look at the old system, the old common law of misrepresentation:
the burden of proof is clear and convincing. Go look at RICO: the burden of proof is preponderance, which is fair. No thumb on the scales for
either side. RICO is fair. The old system had its thumb on the side of the
capitalist, the guy who was taking the money, and not the guy who was
investing the money.
He says I am making a class argument. I am not making a class argument. I believe in the American way, which is that everybody gets an
equal opportunity. A chance for success. And not a chance for success
based on money or power or access to it, which is precisely the corrupt
system he is defending.
I concede that I want to change it, but to make it live up to the American ideal.
He suggests that RICO is a monster and that I am somehow its Dr.
Frankenstein.
Let me suggest to you that RICO is not a monster. It is the slingshot
the Davids of this world can use to have a fair fight with the Goliaths of
white collar crime and organized crime.
He suggests that he is for King's liberty; well, so am I. But the establishment of the King's liberty presupposes the establishment of the
King's peace.
I want equal justice under law-as well as liberty.
II.

Discussion

PROFESSOR COFFEE: I will take questions in a minute, but I just
want to add a third and subversive possibility to this debate. We have
heard two positions: RICO is a monster; RICO is a savior. There is a
third possibility: that the abolition of RICO, if it occurred, wouldn't
change, fundamentally or dramatically, American criminal justice or the
prosecution of white collar crime. The problems that Gordon Crovitz
says are there would persist because of the underlying predicate felonies,
which are elastic and elusive in their definitions. As a result, even without
RICO, prosecutors could do the same thing. E. F. Hutton was indicted
on 1000 counts of mail fraud. I think that was a classic scam, and they
were clearly guilty, but 1000 counts of mail fraud remind you that prosecutors have other ways to leverage up indictments. You can proliferate
counts mainly because you can find mailings or phone calls everywhere.
There are other ways you can get the penalties up if you are so motivated
as a prosecutor and if you are not easily embarrassed by doing that. So
there may be other techniques that would substitute for the supposedly
in terrorem penalties that RICO imposes. Does that mean there is no
problem with RICO? I'm not saying that. I think there could be a
problem.
RICO probably today can be used in the majority of fraud cases. I
think Paul Coffey said something like that yesterday. I will give him a
chance as the first speaker to defend any misstatements that I am making.
Even if it wasn't his statement yesterday, I would assert that RICO probably can be used in the majority of fraud cases, and possibly in the major-
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ity of white collar cases. That could mean that we have a nuclear
deterrent available for cases of low level or marginal culpability. That we
could use the double-barrelled elephant gun to shoot a mouse, or a
rabbit, or maybe rats is a better term here. There could be a problem in
this disproportion. Is that critique true? I think it would depend a lot on
what the internal procedures in the Justice Department are. I think we
know very little, really, about that. The way in which the guidelines work
is very hard to evaluate from a distance. Indeed, the guidelines tend to be
pretty vague and have large exceptions, and we don't really know much
about the way which they are implemented. I am prepared to believe that
Paul Coffey is fair and just. In fact, I believe anyone with that name by
definition is fair. But I don't know that we have the visibility and accountability that we would like.
Today, defense counsel believe that RICO charges are primarily
used to secure plea bargaining advantages. Prosecutors will throw RICO
in, and with that 20 year threat, with that forfeiture of the entire enterprise, and with those other fines, then we know defendants won't go to
trial in marginal cases. And maybe, as Young & Rubicam did yesterday,
they will plead guilty to an overseas questionable payment, where maybe
there was a factual defense had they gone to trial. That's the basic problem that inheres in all plea bargaining. Can you leverage up so that one
side faces the death penalty if they go to trial for a $2 traffic ticket? At
that point they are quite ready to settle that $2 traffic ticket. That's the
way I think some of these issues should be debated. I will mention one
other problem, before I give Paul a chance to respond.
I want to remind you that RICO does not expand the scope of the
criminal law one iota. Rather, it enhances the penalties applicable to the
very elastic predicate felonies. Vagueness may be the critical defect,
which RICO then aggravates. Most notably, the new mail fraud statute
criminalizes anyone who denies another the tangible right to honest services. That comes pretty close to saying "anyone who acts unfairly .... "
Let me raise this jurisprudential question for you. Think about it: would
it be appropriate, just, sensible to have a federal statute that says "anyone who engages knowingly in an immoral act is guilty of a crime." Remember I said "knowingly"-I've eliminated the fair notice problem. I
find that such a statute would be very dangerous for the reason that it
creates tremendous power in the courts to make the law on ex post basis.
Also, it gives prosecutors the power of selective prosecution. That is, we
all know that the majority of our neighbors and friends, not us, but everyone else, occasionally engages knowingly in immoral acts. We know that
the prosecutors cannot prosecute all of those cases, but the ability to pick
and choose transfers great social power to the prosecutor. I am raising
this problem, because in the white collar crime area RICO tends to be
connected with the mail fraud statute more than with anything else. And
unlike Gordon I tend to think that the problem resides less in RICO than
in the open-ended character of some of the underlying predicate
felonies.
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You have heard a different position, a position that maybe some of
these problems, to the extent they are there, would remain without
RICO. Ultimately, even in the absence of RICO, federal prosecutors still
have the ability to use conspiracy charges and to proliferate counts. If
there is a sensible, intermediate solution, it might lie in greater accountability, visibility, and stronger guidelines and a more open, visible office to
implement guidelines. Not only over the indictment, but over other issues, such as the ability to secure forfeiture of the enterprise. I think it
would be appropriate here if I gave a chance to Paul Coffey to respond to
me and my assertions and then I will take questions from the audience.
Just raise your hands and I will recognize you.
MR. COFFEY: First of all, I know that I am not wearing a suit. It's
Saturday at Notre Dame, though. Gordon, the first thing I want to mention was that the tip off from the audience you are addressing should
have come when you mentioned G.K. Chesterton who said of the Irish
many years ago: " For the great Gaels of Ireland / Are the men that God
30
made mad, / For all their wars are merry / And all their songs are sad."
They just see things in a different light, and coming here to Notre Dame
arguing against a strong, aggressive law-enforcement approach to crime,
probably is a little bit like going into an ancient coliseum, and cheering
for the lions when everybody in the stands is next in line to go down into
the field.
My view of America, without getting too high a platform, is that most
people think that the laws should apply equally. And I have a funny story.
In 1971, I had just completed a trial of a loan shark in Boston, and he
had been convicted. I was standing out in the hallway, with an FBI agent,
and we were congratulating each other. This guy walks up, and says,
"Hey, kid you did a good job. I hear good things, and if you ever want a
job just look us up." He shook my hand. I said, "Who are you?" He said,
"I am just a local businessman." The FBI agent started to laugh, and I
said, "What are you laughing at?" He said, "Do you know who that was?"
I said "No." He said, "That was Jerry Angiulo." The same guy talking
about RICO on the tape transcript that Gordon read. One interesting
thing about the Angiulo crowd: one of the principal activities that it was
engaged in, when generating money from its loan-sharking and gambling, was laundering money through the First Bank of Boston. You
probably remember cases against the First Bank of Boston three or four
years ago. The mob was making so much money and was so brazen about
it, that the soldiers in the family were stuffing the bills in these green
trash bags, garbage trash bags, and walking them through the lobby of
the First Bank of Boston, and giving them to cashiers. Millions and millions of dollars, without exaggeration, were being laundered through
these banks in a very short periods of time-months. It was that laundering of money, money that Angiulo was then putting into his legitimate
businesses, that accounts for the recent changes in money laundering
statutes designed to address that type criminal activity. Now it seems to
30 G. K.

CHESTERTON, THE BALLAD OF THE WHITE HORSE

26 (1924).
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me that if a mobster can unlawfully operate the affairs of the bank, the
laws ought to apply equally to the banker who is allowing him to do it.
Now, it is a matter of proof in all of these cases whether we can show
that, the defendants, be they Princeton/Newport, Drexel, or what have
you, are guilty of the crimes. But charges in the indictments specifically
say that they willfully and knowingly engaged in very significant, fundamentally criminal acts; that is what the indictments say. So if this is true it
is kind of hard to argue that the crimes do not apply to bankers.
And another thing accountability: someone mentioned accountability. I will tell you one thing about accountability. Every time an article
appears in the paper, like the "Ham Sandwich" article, or "Captain
Ahab" articles, I usually get a call from the assistant attorney general,
when the New York Times runs these articles, and he says "What the hell
is going on?" The fact of the matter is, all the RICOs that go through the
Organized Crime Section, for better or worse, come across my desk, so
that if something does go wrong, if it turns out that the charges and evidence did not substantiate using this powerful weapon against very high
profile defendants, there is someone who has to account for the review
and authorization of those cases. So for better or worse, I think the rap
against Rudy Giuliani and Bruce Baird yesterday and some of the other
prosecutors is somewhat misdirected. If we are bringing good RICOs or
bad RICOs, the answer lies in the Organized Crime Section because it is
our job to make sure we are bringing good cases we have handled.
The last thing I want to say, did any of you folks see Dangerous Liaisons? There is a scene in it where Glenn Close is talking to, I forget the
name of the fellow, and they are discussing someone. He says about the
other person "You know that guy is very intelligent." But Glenn responds, "He's stupid." "You think he's stupid, that man's a genius, he's
an intellect." But, she says, "Yes, he's a genius, but he is stupid in a way
that only very intelligent people can be stupid." And that, in fact, is a
very subtle, astute observation. The more lawyers, and other intelligent
people who are trained to think in cosmic terms, address a problem, the
easier it is, at least in my opinion, for us to lose focus of what we are
trying to accomplish, which in this case is the creation and preservation
of a very important government program against organized crime. Abolition of the RICO statute would gut that program; it would be stupid.
We should not to get carried away with our own importance. Sometimes we do get carried away bringing the wrong cases in the search of
the Great White-CollarDefendant. The point is that we are trying to fight
the problem. And this tool is very important in addressing that problem.
Businessmen in this day and age who cheat are a big problem, a very big
problem. Tom Wolfe asked the question "Shouldn't we feel bad about
going after the Great White [Collar] Defendant?" I would like to ask the
question in a slightly different way: "Shouldn't we feel bad if we are not
going after the Great White-Collar Defendant?" Isn't there something
terribly wrong with government if we are only going after the disenfranchised. Some defendants are easy marks. Jerry Angiulo, by the way,
is an easy mark. His crowd is so egregiously involved in crime, catching
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them is a matter of time. But the really intelligent people, people who
Glenn Close was talking about, they are a lot harder to catch. Sometimes
to effectively remove their criminal impact on society, we have to use
tools that may seem at first blush to be real heavy-handed. The fact is
that these tools are about all we have to get their attention. All I can tell
you is that when RICOs come across my desk for authorization, we are
very acutely aware, I perhaps more than anyone, of what the fallout will
be if it is brought for the wrong reason. We are convinced that these
cases need to be brought against one and all and we are going to continue to do that.
AUDIENCE: I would like to examine metaphors. Mr. Crovitz wants
to suggest that Milken is an innocent "babe in the woods" and that RICO
is a Frankenstein monster that is scaring Drexel dean. In the recent indictment, just so everyone in the room knows, besides the racketeering
counts there were fifty-five counts of mail and wire fraud, eleven counts
of fraud in the sales securities, twenty counts of fraud in the purchase
and sale of securities, three counts of fraud in connection with a tender
offer, six counts of filing false statements with the SEC, and one count of
assisting in false tax preparations. Without the racketeering indictment,
if he were convicted of these charges, he would serve 480 years in prison
and pay at least $24 million in fines without going into some of the forfeitures to work it out. Do you really think that the Frankenstein monster
is scaring Milken, or do you think that maybe he is not so innocent, that
all these other charges can significantly scare Mr. Milken into doing some
effective plea bargaining?
MR. CROVITZ: If he is going to face 480 years without RICO, why
did the government include RICO? The government included RICO because it makes the trial a lot easier than a securities trial, or a tax trial, or
another trial where the entire discussion in the course of the trial to the
jury is the substantive underlying predicate acts. Instead you walk into
the courtroom and Drexel is described as a continuing racketeering enterprise, Milken referred to as a racketeer. People know what those words
mean. They, for very good reasons, believe the government would not
say something that is not true or contrary to the usual usage of words.
The defendants are then a lot easier to convict. The Princeton/Newport
case is a classic example of how the government can use RICO to bring a
case which is really a tax case where there is very little discussion of the
tax issues involved.
AUDIENCE: He was convicted of parking, of multiple incidences,
maybe as many as thirteen.
MR. CROVITZ: These were tax parking.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Yesterday you admitted that it was more
than tax parking, it was also manipulation.
MR. CROVITZ: There was one of them that was indicted on manipulation, there were some that were only indicted on the tax parking, and
I am talking here about the tax parking.
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PROFESSOR BLAKEY: And not talking about the manipulation?
MR. CROVITZ: No. If somebody manipulates in the stock market,
please, Paul bring a case against them. I can't stand manipulations in the
market.
AUDIENCE: If you do it 200 times, is it still not a pattern? Or if you
do it fifty-five times like in Milken, do you still want to try each one, and
not try a pattern?
PROFESSOR COFFEE: Actually, I can make something out of your
question. The government did have a reason to bring RICO. They
would like to reduce the national debt for last year by $650 million.
AUDIENCE: They are facing $11 billion in forfeitures actually.
PROFESSOR COFFEE: The bond that I think they were negotiating
was in that sort of range. That does supply additional reasons.
MR. CROVITZ: E. F. Hutton came up a minute ago. E. F. Hutton
faced 1000 mail fraud counts. E. F. Hutton is still in business. They were
crooked.
PROFESSOR COFFEE: They went down the tubes and became
Shearson Lehman/E.F. Hutton very quickly thereafter.
MR. CROVITZ: They are still in business. Princeton/Newport went
out of business before the trial, and Drexel had very good reason, based
on Princeton/Newport, to believe that it too would be out of business
before trial. Now Paul Coffey, to his credit, I want to emphasize this, and
the Department ofJustice, after the Princeton/Newport case, issued two
amendments to the manual on when to bring RICO cases, and one of
them said don't bring tax charges as RICO charges, bring them as tax
charges. The other one restricted the amount and the method of pre-trial
forfeitures against legitimate businesses. I think that is a clear recognition, despite of what you have heard today, that there was a serious problem with the Princeton/Newport case. And if we don't have more
Princeton/Newport cases, if there is a Milken trial and the trial is on securities counts, or tax counts, and not on some big racketeering and mail
fraud and wire fraud counts, then more power to you, I hope that we end
up learning something from the trial.
MR. COFFEY: Gordon, do you think that we should have used
RICO in the Chicago pit cases, assuming the evidence alleged in the indictment? I am interested to hear your view on that.
MR. CROVITZ: I have a question about some of these pit cases. You
try to imagine a situation in life where you conduct business without the
telephone, or without sending a letter. About the only example I can
think of is two guys standing next to each other in a pit, and one guy says,
"Hey, if you can sell this to me at this price, I will buy this and I will sell
this to you and you buy that and we both rob the customer and we make
money." That doesn't look like a RICO count to me, it looks like fraud. It
ought to be brought as fraud, but it doesn't look to one like a RICO
count.
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MR. COFFEY: What if the defendant is doing it for a year, and in the
course of a year he may have done this to hundreds of customers. In each
case, he said either literally or words to the effect, "To hell with him [the
customer], I want to make my money." And if we assume, just for the
purpose of the argument, that was done in a fraudulent manner, do you
think we ever get to the point, I could make it two years or three years,
would we ever get to the point where you say, "Well, all right, maybe
RICO becomes fair," or is it your position that RICO simply has no place
in securities prosecution?
MR. CROVITZ: My position on the pit case is this. The difference
between white collar criminals and mobsters is white collar criminals do
not assume that going to jail is just part of their job. A lot of the mobsters
do. However, there is no equality between mobsters and white collar
criminals in terms of public perception. There is a lack of such equality,
without regard to how the crime was committed. The National Law Journal took a poll last year, and asked people, "If a bank is robbed of $5000,
what do you think the punishment should be?" under two different examples. The first example it gave was the bank was robbed by a gunman,
who came in and held up the bank and got $5000. And the average
number of years people thought he ought to serve was about twenty. A
lot more than he would really serve, but that's what most people
thought-about twenty years. The second example is an accountant who
siphons off $5000. The average period of prison sentence people
thought that he ought to get was about five years, but a lot of people
thought he shouldn't have to go to jail at all. Now I may be more a hawk
on whether he ought to go to jail at all than most Americans are, but I
think that poll indicates the truth, which is that we have throughout our
history viewed violent crime very differently from economic crime. And I
think that we cloud the issue, we fail to devote resources to fighting
drugs, violent crime, for clearing up ghettos where people live under
twenty-four hour fear, and instead go off on what are sometimes true
larks by prosecutors. True larks at a time when there has never been so
much violent crime in this country. Never have there been so many people who fear to go out of their homes. It just seems to me that the whole
RICO debate is based on this notion that there is somehow equality, and
that has led to a terrible misallocation of resources.
I want Wall Street to be prosecuted for crimes. Wall Street is very
important to me, and it has to be run by clear rules, where everybody
knows the rules, and nobody cuts comers. I am all for that. What I am
saying though is we have got laws that will take care of that. Don't cloud
it up with RICO. Don't make martyrs of people by RICOing them, rather
then taking them down an old-fashioned way. If you want something like
RICO, and if you think you can't make cases against Mafia families without something like RICO, let's go back and take another look at it, and
have the debate that we had in the late 60's, before RICO, which was all
about the mob family and how we helped prosecute them and bring
down the mob. And we have to change the conspiracy laws, change the
forfeiture laws. Let's talk about that. I just think that RICO has become a
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terrible leviathan on the criminal side, and also on the civil side. In order
to clear the air here, we ought to go back to first principles and decide
how we really want to allocate prosecutorial resources.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Gordon, let me make two comments on part
of what you have said. One of them is about Princeton/Newport. More
people here ought to realize that this was a small partnership in which a
high degree of skill by the partners was required. The truth of the matter
is that as soon as those people were indicted for felonies, and it looked
like they were going to go to jail, that partnership bit the dust. As soon as
the principal guy was going to go to jail-was going to lose his brokers
license-the business was no longer a viable partnership.
If it had been a large corporation, it could have lost a major figure. It
was not; it was a small partnership. And that would have been the case,
whether he was indicted for RICO, or for securities fraud, or for tax
fraud. That partnership went down on that ground independent of the
RICO forfeiture, at least in my judgment, and the people I talk to, and
incidently, I know the prosecutors and the defense counsel in that case,
and they will tell you that, at least privately.
Let me raise for you the second point. William White, a very prominent sociologist, did a study ofjuvenile kids in the ghetto. He asked them
for a number of things. What was the impact on them of various factors
in their life? And one of the things that contributed to their attitude toward society-their failure to adopt society's work-earn-save philosophy-was the perception that there was a double standard. The poor had
one set of standards and the rich had another, and the rich people got
away. They did it and got away. The poor people got the wrong end of
the stick.
I suggest to you that what's important sometimes about prosecuting
a Jimmy Hoffa-putting him in jail-is not entirely that the Teamsters
Union get a little cleaner, because in fact it turned out not to be a lot
cleaner. But what people saw, in some sense, was that Jimmy Hoffa was
not above the law, and that is precisely the same thing with a Mike
Milken.
It is precisely the same thing with an Anguilo.
It is not simply putting that person in jail. It is showing that the
King's writ runs not only on Mulberry Street, but on Wall Street.
I agree with you that we ought to allocate resources. The states are
not doing white collar crime; they are doing overwhelmingly street
crime. If the Feds pull out of white collar crime and organized crime, it
will not be prosecuted at all. And the Feds do not have resources to do it.
The SEC has a budget of about $135 million. The Commodities Future
Trading Corporation has a budget of about $40 million. Mike Milken's
salary last year was $550 million. The Southern District of New York has
a budget of $22 million.
Unless we are able to energize, not only public resources but also
private resources, in an effort to control this kind of conduct, it won't
happen. The empirical studies done by economists of the antitrust statute, which contains a similar model of public enforcement (both civil and
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criminal) and private enforcement of triple damages, correlates the price
of bread to the level of enforcement, and it was not criminal enforcement, it was triple damages that kept the price of bread down. If we have
effective enforcement of the antitrust laws, we won't have the price of
bread fixed.
Lack of freedom in the marketplace is one thing; lack of integrity in
the marketplace is another. The little investor is out of the marketplace.
Ten or fifteen years ago sixty percent of the stock in this country was
held by households; now it's about half of that. Sixty percent of the
trades in the market today are trades by large institutional investors, not
the little guy.
Formerly, the little guy would buy a company and believe in the
company; it was his company; he would stick to it, and he would hold it
even though its profits temporaily went down. Now we have the institutional investor with short term memory-in and out. We have a very different market than we once did. I am not denying that the money of the
little investor does not go into the mutual funds. His money is probably
better off in the mutual fund, just to get professional investment. I am
just saying that it is a very different market today. It is mainly for only
institutional investors, being run by managers, as opposed to companies
being owned by aggregates of small people, who care about the country
and the company.
MR. CROVITZ: Can I make a point of fact on Princeton/Newport
because it is such an interesting case. It was not the indictment that led
investors to flee Princeton/Newport. The investors in Princeton/Newport were not penny stock brokers or wildcatters or arbitrageurs. The
investors in Princeton/Newport, the two largest ones, were the Harvard
University endowment, not a radical investor, and McKinsey and Co.'s
own pension plan. Both of them left because they feared the possible
effect of forfeiture on their own funds in Princeton/Newport. They stuck
with the company during the posting of a bond, they even stuck with
them to the end of the year when they had to decide whether they were
going to renew. There was no indication by the government about how
much of their money, if any, could be forfeited. They said they could not
afford the risk. The company went out of business just like that.
MR. COFFEY: They were afraid of our superseding indictment. You
are right in what they said. You say that the original forfeiture did not
effect PNP's ability to continue. PNP claimed that the prosecutors said
they were going to supersede and ask for additional forfeiture. They
claim that the prosecutor said "I won't be able to tell you until January."
They say that they had to decide whether to commit to the entire year by
December.
PROFESSOR COFFEE: The partnership agreement expired on December 31; the limited partners had to recommit. So they say they got
out then.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: What's the alternative? Not indict them because they might go out of business?
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MR. CROVITZ: The alternative is, if you think they have violated
the tax law, bring a tax case.
MR. COFFEY: But we thought they violated the insider trading and
stock manipulation.
MR. CROVITZ: Well, there's no conviction on insider trading.
MR. COFFEY: Gordon, even the defendants in that case-I think
you know this, but if you don't, I don't think there is any reason why I
can't tell you. When they came in on a preindictment conference in
Washington, I met with them. They objected strenuously to any indictment wherein the entire pattern of racketeering would be tax parking.
After listening to them, I decided and told the prosecution and the defense attorneys that no RICO would be authorized against any defendant
in Princeton/Newport unless each such defendant was charged with one
additional, generically different activity. So each of the five defendants
was charged with tax parking and either the one or the other of the predicates: insider trading and stock manipulation. Now as you know at trial
Judge Carter didn't like the theory of one of those predicates. The jury
didn't like the theory on some of the others, and when all was said and
done, only one of the five defendants was convicted of what we were
calling in the case "tax plus": tax plus some other type of activity. But
that's something over which we had no control. We don't agree with
Judge Carter's decision. We don't think he applied the law correctly on
whether there were other victims in the tax parking other than Uncle
Sam; for example, the other investors, the investment community in general. The point is that, when we authorized the case, we listened to the
defense attorneys, we thought they made a good point, we accommodated their point, and we changed the prosecutive theory to make sure
that we were not bringing a pure tax parking case. And then afterwards
when the judge made his decision, the defenses attorneys raged from
pillar to post that we had brought a pure tax case.
PROFESSOR COFFEE: Couldn't you have reconsidered the RICO
rationale?
MR. COFFEY: Well, they asked us to, and it wasn't an easy call to
make. But at that point, because we felt the judge was wrong, because we
felt that what remained in the case included one of the additional tax plus
charges, it still was an appropriate RICO. Now if this case came in today,
Princeton/Newport, if it came in on the basis of the jury's convictions,
that is, a prosecutive theory came in and was just tax parking, we would
not authorize it. But I think today's session, as I understand it, is looking
ahead as opposed to looking back. So in this particular context the point
ought to be: in the future, is the government going to be using RICO for
tax parking cases? The answer is no. Are we going to be using RICO in
very thin securities cases? The answer is no because the securities statutes themselves have been recently buttressed with more jail time and
more penalties to take the weight off our need to use RICO. Consequently, I expect the Southern District will not perceive the need to bring
these cases.
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AUDIENCE [to Mr. Crovitz]: It seems to me that your argument for
a future racketeering statute would exclude a mobster who wasn't involved in something violent; say they were involved in drugs and prostitution and financially and weren't involved in violent crime. Is that an
unfair characterization?
MR. CROVITZ: I think, are there fifty-two predicate offenses?
MR. COFFEY: Yes, fifty-two. Plus fraud and some generic references
to include securities.
MR. CROVITZ: I mean there is loan-sharking, there is gambling,
prostitution maybe, drugs certainly.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Let me list 4 categories: violence-that includes murder, robbery and kidnapping; the provision of illegal goods
and services-that's drugs, prostitution, and gambling; corruption involving the government or unions, that includes extortion and fraud; and
finally commercial fraud, whether it is mail fraud or wire fraud or securities fraud.
MR. CROVITZ: My view is that we ought to go back to the debate
we had in the 60's where prosecutors believe they can't convict these
mob families-and there is some new evidence now that proves the Sicilian Mafia was really untouched by the very good victories of the 80's.
MR. COFFEY: Unfortunately that is correct.
MR. CROVITZ: We have a continuing problem. I certainly recognize that. If prosecutors believe they need extra powers to get those people, which they very well may, I think we ought to give it to them. What I
object to is the vagueness: we generally know what murder is, we know
what prostitution is, we know what drugs are; we don't know what mail
fraud is, what wire fraud is, or what securities fraud is.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Make no mistake: there are marginal cases
in homicide, where you don't know if it's homicide or not. Bernard
Goetz is an example. Was that self-defense or homicide? One grand jury
said no; they reindicted; they retried it, and it was an extremely controversial thing. It always will be. We don't know when day becomes night in
any statute at the margin.
Let me carry it a little bit further. What you do when you talk about
the maximum penalty in a minimum liability situtation and treat it as if it
were a RICO-specific question is really deceptive.
I can take robbery, which you will grant is a traditional common law
crime, and I can show you a kid who is nine or ten, with a stick, who takes
a bicycle from another kid. That's an armed robbery. And at the other
end of the scale we can take a John Dillinger. The same statute applies to
John Dillinger and to the child.
And there is no way, using language, which includes logical universals, that you won't encompass a wide range of activity within any concept. And anytime you do, there will always be marginal cases at the edge
of the concept. The truth of the matter is that there are vast numbers of
RICO that are absolutely clear and that nobody has any quarrel with, you
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see them and you recognize them. If you're not familiar with them, then
the thing to do is to go read the materials.
For us to concentrate on Princeton/Newport is to make the debate
turn on one unrepresentative illustration.
Is that an illustration of an aberration, or is that an illustration of an
characteristic of the matter?
The truth of the matter is that the securities fraud cases are about
1%o of RICO. Organized crime is 37%. The white collar crime other than
securities, is 44%y. Let's get a range of these cases.
MR. CROVITZ: Let's talk about the 90% of civil RICO cases that
have nothing to do with any racket except some tennis rackets. And that's
your bill.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: No, that's your definition of racket. I think a
guy who steals with a machine gun, from the point of view of the guy who
loses the money-there is no difference whether it was stolen with a pen
or stolen with a pistol. The widow and the orphan still don't have the
money. Tell the people who bought the bonds from Keating that what
they should be worried about is marijuana, rather than their life savings.
Charles Keating, in setting up a Lincoln Savings and sucking the money
out of it, as the testimony in trial yesterday indicated-fifteen transactions-$155 million-generated property by giving away my money.
Money that you recognize, and I agree with you, we insure. Is that not
organized crime? In fact, it doesn't even have the justification that organized crime does. Fat Tony Salerno grew up poor. Fat Tony Salerno didn't
have the opportunities in life that a Charles Keating did. Fat Tony Salerno had no education. What's Charles Keating's excuse? Well-educated, a Harvard lawyer, who manipulates the system and walks away.
There is a sense in which he is more responsible, not less, because of his
background.
MR. CROVITZ: That's exactly the argument I think that has led to
the true allegations of a double standard in law enforcement that I think
has a lot a merit. The true argument about double standards is not that
the state and federal prosecutors go after the poor. The allegation from a
lot of ghetto neighbors is that the white power structure, as they put it,
doesn't enforce the laws in their neighborhoods. Some even allege that
there is an conspiracy to import drugs and to allow drug sales, maybe
even import AIDS. Some of these wild conspiracy theories are wild. Some
of them have a grain of truth based on the philosophy you've just offered
which is that there are some people you just shouldn't prosecute for
crimes, and there are others who, even if laws aren't vague, we ought to
throw the whole federal government at.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: I'm saying that Keating should be prosecuted too.
MR. CROVITZ: What Keating should be prosecuted for is classic
misrepresentation, telling little old ladies that these were government
guaranteed bonds when they weren't. There is no simpler kind of case.
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PROFESSOR BLAKEY: But Gordon, there is a difference between
rape and gang rape. Let him go down for rape. If he engages in gang
rape, let him go down for gang rape.
MR. COFFEY: Bob, you know what you've just done? Monday
morning there is going to be an editorial in the Wall Street Journal entitled "Gang Rape RICO." (Laughter)
MR. CROVITZ: Paul, if you would like to write it, I will put your
name on it.

PROFESSOR BLAKEY: We have an agreement that none of this will
be held against us in other forms.
PROFESSOR COFFEE [to audience]: Any other participants?
AUDIENCE: Professor Blakey, personally I would rather someone
take that front company and use a piece of paper to take $5000 out of my
bank account, than someone took their .45 and put it up against my head
and took $5000 out of my pocket.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Why do you have to choose? Why can't we
prosecute them both?
AUDIENCE: I would like to prosecute both of them, but I believe
that there is a difference. I personally would rather one happen than the
other. I think, based on that, that Mr. Crovitz's distinction between those
two is valid.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: I grant the distinction that violence is
worse.
AUDIENCE [To Professor Blakey]:
Look at the mail fraud statutes-you teach us how to look at them. Then you show us the cases, you
show us that those words are difficult to understand, even when the finest
jurists in this country, or the federal bench, look at them, they have a
difficult time understanding consistently what they are. RICO is a magnifier lens. Is it a good idea to take that magnifier and apply it in those
areas? Or would it be better to limit our magnifier to the places where we
have maybe 500 years of traditional common law to understand the thing
rather than fifteen?
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: The easy answer is this. When I was in the
Department in the early 60's, we prosecuted mob figures occasionally. I
can count on one hand the people we got. We simply didn't have much
impact on them. We didn't know how to organize ourselves; we didn't
have access to the necessary investigative means, we didn't have a way to
try them; we didn't have adequate sentence for them. And, in fact, people
sat down after the experience of the Kennedy Administration and figured
out what was wrong. And when we figured out what was wrong in the
mob cases, we figured out what was wrong in all cases involving organizations. You are right: the mob was the occasion for RICO, but it didn't
define the scope of the statute. What we learned in the mob cases we
also learned applied to all organized crime-type cases. That doesn't mean
just the mafioso. It also applies to white collar crime and other kinds of

1990]

THE FUTURE OF RICO

1101

organized crime. And the world is different today. He [Paul Coffey] can
come here and say he took out the family in LA, he took out the family in
Chicago, he took out the family in 9 other major cities.
We were counting on one hand individual prosecutions. When we
thought individually, we caught only individuals, and, even then, we were
not terribly successful. When we began to think about groups and patterns of behavior, it changed the way investigations went down, trials
went down, and sanctions went down. And the world today is a better
world, not worse. More people are accountable today for what they do.
Going back to the 60's, they weren't accountable. Period.
MR. COFFEY: Gordon, what do you think about Ferdinand Marcos
and General Noriega. Should we use RICO against them?
MR. CROVITZ: No.
MR. COFFEY: Why not?
MR. CROVITZ: Let's take the easier case first: 'the fellow sweating it
out in Miami. He ran drugs. If the US government wants to go around
the world indicting and prosecuting foreign heads of state who run
drugs, that is fine with me. In fact, I am for it. I think we can get Noriega.
I think that would be a nifty way to get to Fidel Castro, who was been in a
lot of meetings with Noriega, who remains unindicted. If you are going
to bring cases against foreign heads of state, let's have equal protection
and get some of the other ones as well as Noriega. I don't think you need
RICO to do it. Drug cases are drug cases.
MR. COFFEY: But there is more than drug charges. For example, in
the Ferdinand Marcos indictment there are allegations that he ripped off
his people through extortions and embezzlement of US funds, and the
like. Not only don't the drug statutes fit that, and in Noriega there are
allegations of non-drug activities as well, but if you try to use some other
individual statutes, such as mail or wire fraud, the judge never could hold
the case together.
MR. CROVITZ: I'll tell you what I am afraid of. I'm afraid that if you
use the racketeering label against people whom the jury may think are
kind of nasty and hateful characters, but they know they aren't racketeers, whatever that means in people's minds, I am afraid you risk not
getting a conviction in what ought to be relatively straightforward cases
based on narrower charges. We will see, and I wish you all the luck in
pursuing those cases. But I do worry that one of the problems with RICO
is that you end up letting off people who could have been convicted on a
lesser, more clear charge without this.
MR. COFFEY: Doesn't that suggest that if a person reaches a certain
recognizable position in society, such as a head of state, or a banker, that
no one could be called a racketeer because that term is defined by how it
was perceived in the 1920s, so now it is no longer fair to broaden that
perception against these other people?
MR. CROVITZ: You are not really saying that the US government
thinks that bankers and Noriega and Marcos are all three similar. I mean
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Noriega and Marcos both-well, with Noriega clearly-the allegations
charge an awful lot of violence, including murder. Juries understand
that. It seems to me that leaves a chance of winning that case. I don't
know why you have to enlarge those.
MR. COFFEY: The answer is we have to, because RICO is the only
tool available to us that creates, in federal court, a statutory vehicle for
combining all of these different crimes, at different times and different
locations in one case.
MR. CROVITZ: If we want to use the Justice Department as a tool
of foreign policy, then Justice should abide by a set of guidelines for
prosecutions. To indict a foreign head of state, prosecutors should be
required to get the approval of the State Department, the Defense Department, and the President himself. Then I think we ought to amend
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to include some acts by foreign heads
of state. If you want to do that, that's fine. If you want to define it more
broadly than we would define it for US citizens, that's okay with me too.
But I think to go after those guys you shouldn't put at risk some of the
people who have been victimized by RICO here.
AUDIENCE: If Noriega extorts, and murders, and runs drugs, isn't
he just like a mob family? Isn't he a racketeer?
MR. CROVITZ: If you were going to have a status crime, if we were
going to sit down and try to draft what the Supreme Court would now
say is an unconstitutional status crime, I certainly would not think we
would limit it to people with Italian names. How you would draft it is no
mean feat. That's why the court would hold it unconstitutional. If we
want to try, we could probably come up with a description of what we
really mean by organized crime. And I don't think that organized crime
in such a definition is very likely to include tax fraud.
PROFESSOR COFFEE: Paul, can I go back to your question for a
minute, because, I think Gordon let something go by because I don't
think he is principally a proceduralist. You made the justification that
one of the important advantages of RICO that we haven't been talking
about this morning is that it allows events at widely separated times,
among people who don't know each other, who belong to different
groups and have little conspiracies, to be grouped into one giant RICO
conspiracy. That could present the following problem in my opinion.
Consider for the moment that there may be defendants who either have a
meritorious defense or that no one knows till the jury speaks whether
they are guilty or innocent. Also in the same case we have not only
money laundering, but we have other aspects of this Mafia family that
have engaged in loan-sharking, prostitution, hit-man murder, and extortion. Now we have a trial in which there sixty-five defendants. Many of
them wearing dark shirts with white ties. There are one or two white
collar defendants over here who may have been involved in money laundering the proceeds. Hence, there are some complicated defenses that
go to their mens rea, whether they really knew whether this money was
coming in legally or not. It is very useful to the prosecution to be able to

1990]

THE FUTURE OF RICO

1103

stick marginal or peripheral defendants right there in the middle of the
rest of the Mafia family. It's useful, but are there fairness issues in that?
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: They will probably get off by innocence by
association.
MR. COFFEY: No, I don't think so. (Laughter).
PROFESSOR COFFEE: There is a difference with RICO because it
allows you to take people who are in one conspiracy to commit money
laundering, and another conspiracy to commit murder, and say both of
these conspiracies were part of an enterprise being run through a pattern
of racketeering.
MR. COFFEY: In one sense, it all depends on the precise way the
question is articulated. RICO critics say how can you take five defendants
from one conspiracy, put them in the same trial as five defendants in
another conspiracy and call it all one conspiracy? Take the example of
this organization: You [referring to Professor Coffee] are a banker, and
we agree that you will launder money from my drug trade. A few months
pass. By that time you would be getting some money from me. You invest it, put it in a business. You then talk to Bob, he's involved with,
maybe, hijacking. If the evidence is sufficient to show at trial that we all
knew the general outline of the mob group, it is fair game to have all
defendants in the same charges.
That's aside from the Casamento problem, where the case is too big to
try. But it's now one conspiracy. I remember the first RICO trial I had, I
had this type of situation. We were saying that the defendants were loan
sharks and gamblers and the hijackers and stuff like that. The public generally responds to the mafia as one department store. And sometimes the
people in the shoe department don't know what is happening up in the
credit union. The credit union doesn't know how well they are doing
down in ladies underwear. It is all part of one department store. They
have a common economic goal, they have a common agreement, it is
foreseeable the department store will have various aspects to it. If the
department store is operating unlawfully, and then the persons are the
right targets.
PROFESSOR COFFEE: I hear you; but notice, you changed your
facts. You made a case out of Meyer Lansky making obscene amounts of
money. I gave you a slightly different one. It may be the Gambino family.
They got a lawyer or an investment banker who approaches an honest
bank vice president to inquire about processing large amounts of money.
The vice president may or may not be guilty; there are factual issues that
you could raise at trial. The problem is that this defendant will be submerged. The jury, on the sixty-first day of the trial, after hearing about
eight hit men, and five counts of interstate prostitution and pornography,
finally begins to hear his case. Now he is submerged in what some people
would call a circus trial.
MR. COFFEY: It might be a circus, but that's the judge's fault.
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PROFESSOR COFFEE: It wouldn't happen if we had one conspiracy. This is the area where I think conspiracy and RICO do present different procedural settings in the courtroom because instead of having a
single conspiracy to commit interstate violence, we've got multiple conspiracies with little real connection. A corrupt Mafia family will engage in
anything illegal that looks like it will be profitable. But it brings together
all kinds of people who are in legitimate enterprises but may or may not
have succumbed to the overture to launder some money for the family,
or otherwise engage in the peripheral side of these activities.
MR. COFFEY: I think we are perfectly entitled, when we find activity
that is unlawful under the common law, or under any some sense of the
general public, I think it is perfectly fair and appropriate for a prosecutor
to go to the book, which we do thousands of times a year, and look for
statutes that technically apply to that activity.
PROFESSOR COFFEE: If Clark Clifford-who has probably the
best known lobbyist over the last twenty years and has been in and out of
most Democratic Administrations-sends a bill for legal services to his
client, but it really is a bill for lobbying services because he talked to
several senators to explain to them why they shouldn't like a piece of
legislation, can this be called mail fraud? Assume that he sends a bill to
his client "$50,000 for legal services." Under your theory, he could be
indicted. It's the same as misrepresentation, because if you're saying that
it's fair for the law to make that fraud, all that protects Clark Clifford is
that prosecutors don't dislike him.
MR. CROVITZ: Can I give you another example? What happens if
somebody leaves a part of government, say a former congressman, and
becomes a lawyer, who has access to the floor of the House, and takes
advantage of that access. He talks to his former colleagues about legislation that maybe they might want to pass, he sends a bill to his clients who
will benefit from that legislation, he marks that as a legal bill and not a
lobbying bill, you know this somebody who has held a public office, who
has access to Congress, that seems to me to be-under your view of the
law-that is a crime that occurs dozens and dozens of times every week.
MR. COFFEY: You don't view that as a crime?
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: I am not so sure that legitimate lobbying is
not legal. But what he was purporting to do was not just lobbying, he was
purportedly illegally lobbying.
MR. COFFEY: I don't consider the Keating case to be lobbying, I
consider the focus to be abuse of the public trust. In your hypothetical, I
would consider that to be a crime, but if the ex-congressman said to his
client, "I think I got a real good chance next term of getting back in this
House because they are going to redistrict, and you pay me money now, I
will strike a deal with another Congressman to join a bill that I'm going
to introduce when I back into the House," I think that's a crime.
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MR. CROVITZ: If you want to see a public reaction to a case outside
the unique situation in Keating, then bring one of those cases. Then you
can see the reaction: it's going to be one of horror, if you bring a case like
that.
MR. COFFEY: Oh boy, we always get reactions of horror in Congress when we we're looking into Congressional corruption. (Laughter.)
MR. CROVITZ: This may be one time where even those of us who
think the Congress is a terribly corrupt institution would say that we've
gone too far.
MR. COFFEY: A lot of people thought we shouldn't have brought
the Abscam cases, as you know.
MR. CROVITZ: We supported you.
MR. COFFEY: That's what's wonderful about the Journal Board. It's
so supportive of law enforcement 99% of the time, I can't for the life of
me figure how we are missing the boat involving white collar criminals.
MR. CROVITZ: That's why we have to write so often this subject,
trying to help you out here.
MR. COFFEY: You single out the white collar defendants as having
some type of special rules, the law of thejungle. But when we move into
public officials, or mobsters, or something like that, there's no apparent
disapproval on your part when we charge these people with the same
crimes.
MR. CROVITZ: No, that is actually not our position. Our position
on RICO as it now stands is that it ought be abolished. It ought not to be
used against even the people which we consider it applies to because of
the abuses that have occurred.
MR. COFFEY: Civil RICO abuses?
MR. CROVITZ: And criminal-both. Civil obviously. And that's because, as the guidelines written in 1981 predicted, if you allow imaginative prosecutions under RICO, if you brought cases far afield from the
language of the guidelines and the original purpose of RICO, which was
organized crime, you are going to get a lot of bad publicity because you
run the risk, that I think has occurred, of sending a lot innocent people to
jail without having done anything. You and I share an interest in law
enforcement, and I would think that you are putting it somewhat at risk.
PROFESSOR COFFEE: We've gone about seven minutes over the
scheduled time, and this probably could go on all day, it may for years
yet. But I want to say that not since St. George met the dragon have I
seen a more interesting exchange of views. I will leave everybody to form
their own opinion about who is St. George and who is dragon. (Laughter
and applause.)

